Abstract-Digital watermarking is an emerging technique to protect data security and intellectual property right. Identification or verification of watermarking patterns can be achieved by detecting watermarks in received signals. However, one of the biggest challenges in watermarking detection is that the strengths of the watermark signals will change after being distorted by an attacker in a watermarking channel. Meanwhile, the embedding strengths may be adapted to original signals, which are unknown at the receiver end. Further, the original signals are often highly non-Gaussian. Although some work has been done on optimum detection of watermarks, the uncertainty of watermark signal strengths and real statistical behavior of multimedia contents have not been taken into account simultaneously. Much more study is needed to enhance the performance of watermarking systems. Since multiplicative watermarks are robust and well suited for copyright protection, this paper presents our investigation on robust optimum detection of multiplicative watermarks. For sub-band transformed domains such as the discrete cosine transform (DCT), discrete wavelet transform (DWT), and pyramid transform, a class of generalized correlators is constructed based on the generalized Gaussian distributions. Thresholding methods to achieve a given false alarm rate, and the performance analyses are provided. The square-root detector is designed and demonstrated to have near optimal performance for a large set of natural images and can be employed as a "universally optimal" detector or decoder for images and video. The locally most powerful detection method is then extended to DFT domain multiplicative watermarking, with the magnitudes of coefficients modeled by the Weibull distributions. Another class of detectors is built based on this statistical modeling. The robust optimum detection of multiplicative watermarks can be applied to copyright notification, enforcement, and broadcast monitoring. We have applied the robust optimum watermarking detection to combined audio and video watermarking.
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TSP.2003.809374 [2] . It embeds hidden secondary data into digital multimedia products for copyright notification and protection, content authentication, transaction-tracing, and covert communication.
The main advantage of watermarking is that it provides a way to deliver side information through primary multimedia contents in a seemingly innocuous and standards-compliant fashion, such that many novel functionalities can be enabled. In steganography or security applications, secret messages may be transmitted covertly through a perceptually innocent image or audio. In multimedia database retrieval, watermarking patterns associated with annotations or keywords may be imprinted seamlessly into host media to facilitate future accurate access. In broadcast monitoring and copy control techniques, watermarking can actively and cost-effectively identify specific multimedia contents in digital TV, audio, or video broadcasting or playing back such that royalty collection can be automated or illegal copying prevented.
Since the inception of digital watermarking around the early 1990s, there have been a variety of methods proposed in the literature, and there are many ways to classify them. For example, some approaches deal with the signals in the sample (spatial or time) domain, while others deal with transformed data. Some private watermarking schemes need the knowledge of host multimedia signals in decoding, whereas blind watermarking schemes do not. We will view watermarking as the following information system with side information available only to the embedder [3] - [7] . A secret message or pattern is encoded by an encoder or embedder into a watermark and hidden into the host medium within an embedding distortion level. The composite signal is then input into the watermarking channel, where an attacker attempts to disrupt the watermark by introducing additional distortions. The channel output is a corrupted or noised composite signal. A decoder decodes the watermark bit by bit or symbol by symbol, or a detector detects or verifies the existence of a specific watermarking pattern or specific message.
According to the roles of watermarks to play in this information system, the existing schemes are classified into two categories. In the first category, watermarks serve as transmission codes, where an ordinary communication channel model is used, and where a message is encoded by the embedder and the decoder carries out full decoding to extract the message [3] - [6] . The embedding often needs to partition or enforce the host signal space into subsets that are mapped to the values taken by the watermark. For example, sign enforcement [8] , [9] and table-lookup [10] , [11] are two basic ways to do the partition. More sophisticated approaches incorporate the Costa scheme [12] for high channel capacity, and quantization is exploited for set partitioning [6] , [13] . These schemes have high rates, and the original host signals will not form a noise source to interfere with the decoding. However, these schemes are usually not very robust [13] since the robustness of these schemes depends on tolerance zones or minimum intersymbol distances that are always very limited due to the perceptual quality requirement [13] .
In the second category, watermarks serve as verification codes, where full decoding is not really necessary, but only to decide whether or not a particular message or hypothesized pattern is present or has been transmitted. Thus, a binary decision is often required. In copyright protection or notification and broadcast monitoring, such verification watermarking usually suffices [7] . Remarkably, a double exponential number of messages can be verified reliably in a verification channel. Instead, an exponential number of messages can be reliably transmitted in an ordinary watermarking transmission model.
In most watermarking verification schemes, without deterministic mapping from set partition of host signal space to watermark symbols, host signals are often modeled as noise, and many approaches have been taken to suppress noise from both host signals and attacks to improve detection effectiveness. For example, the additive spread spectrum scheme spreads the watermark signal to many components [14] , and the maximum watermark strengths are obtained from just-noticeable-differences (JND) [15] - [17] . Since a number of samples collectively contribute to the detection of a watermark pattern, such verification watermarking usually has high robustness, even though its ability to recover more than one information bit might not be as great as that of transmission watermarking. Thus, it is more suitable for applications such as copyright protection or notification, copy control, device control, and broadcast monitoring.
Identification or verification of watermarking patterns can be achieved by detecting the watermarks in the received signals [7] , [18] . However, one of the biggest challenges in watermarking detection is that the strengths of the watermark signals would change after being distorted by the attacker in the watermarking channel. Meantime, the embedding strengths may be adapted to the original signals that are unknown at the receiver end. Further, the original signals are often highly non-Gaussian. Although some work has been done on optimum detection of watermarks, robust optimum detection still needs much study. In the literature, the watermarks are often embedded in either an additive way or a multiplicative way. An optimum detection structure for additive watermarks has been derived [20] - [23] , and accurate performance analyses have been developed based on the generalized Gaussian distributions (GGDs). Multiplicative watermarks are automatically image content dependent [19] and are automatically embedded mainly into the perceptually most significant components of the image. The perceptual models based on Weber's law can be easily exploited. Due to these desired properties, multiplicative watermarks have considerable robustness, and they are well-suited for copyright protection. For multiplicative watermarks, a correlation detector is often used [14] , [19] . It is simple and intuitively appealing; however, its employment for the detection of multiplicative watermarks cannot be justified, and in the discrete Fourier transform (DFT) domain, a new detection structure has been derived [24] , [25] . In Section II, it is to be shown that the correlator actually cannot work for multiplicative watermarks in many sub-band transformed domains such as the discrete cosine transform (DCT), discrete wavelet transform (DWT), and pyramid transforms. For multiplicative watermarks embedded in the magnitudes of DFT coefficients, the correlator can work, but it is optimal only when the magnitudes follow the exponential distribution.
To obtain the best performance, optimum detection of the multiplicative watermarks needs to be investigated. In this paper, a class of robust optimum detection statistics taking into account perceptual masking effects and attacks is derived, based on the generalized Gaussian distributions for multiplicative watermarks in sub-band transformed domains such as DCT, DWT, and pyramid transforms. The performance of the proposed detector is examined using the ordinary Gaussian distribution. The commonly used Laplacian distribution is a special case of the GGD law, and the optimum detector corresponding to it is also examined in this paper. Their performances are compared with the optimum detector corresponding to shape parameter , which is identified as a "universally optimum" detector for its near-optimal performance for a large set of natural images. The methodology is then extended to multiplicative watermarks embedded in the magnitudes of DFT coefficients. Another class of optimum detectors is obtained by using the Weibull distribution. The threshold achieving a given false alarm probability is provided. The effectiveness of the optimum detection is demonstrated by extensive experiments. The robust optimum detection for multiplicative watermarks can be applied to copyright notification, enforcement, and broadcast monitoring. In this paper, an application of the optimum detector to combined audio and video watermarking is proposed for the purpose of content authentication.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Multiplicative embedding rule is introduced in Section II. The robust optimum detection rule for GGD is derived in Section III. The methodology is extended to DFT-domain multiplicative watermarking in Section IV. Experiments are conducted in Section V to validate the analysis. Section VI applies the optimum detector to the combined audio and video watermarking. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. MULTIPLICATIVE WATERMARK EMBEDDING RULE AND DETECTIONS
A. Multiplicative Embedding Rule and Correlator
For identification or verification watermarking channel, a watermark pattern is embedded at the transmission end. In the literature, the embedding makes use of either an additive watermark embedding rule or a multiplicative one.
The commonly used additive embedding rule is [14] , [19] (
where is a sequence of data from the (transformed) original image, is a sequence of watermark signals, is a gain factor, and is a sequence of watermarked data. Using the same notation, the commonly used multiplicative embedding rule is [14] , [19] (2) For detection or verification, the receiver needs to verify if a specific watermarking pattern exists or not. For full decoding of a message similar to ordinary communication, orthogonal modulation combined with code division multiple access (CDMA) can be applied [26] , [27] . To these ends, a correlator is often used [19] : is present is not present (3) where is a threshold. For additive watermarks, the correlator can work, but it is optimal only if the distribution is Gaussian. Optimum detectors as well as the performance analysis for additive watermarks have been investigated [18] , [20] - [23] . For multiplicative watermarks embedded in many sub-band transformed domains, such as DCT, DWT, and pyramid transforms, it is shown as follows that this correlator actually cannot work at all when the watermark is independent of the original signal. Indeed, for sub-band coefficients , , consider the verification of . When there is no channel attack at all, if there is no watermark; then, since is zero mean; on the other hand, if there is such a watermark; then,
. A simple fix to this problem is to change the embedding rule but keep the detection rule. For example, the following rules can be used: or , where is the signum function of , namely, it is 1 when ; otherwise, it is 1. In this way, the correlator can work but it is still not optimum. Another fix is to keep the embedding rule but change the detection rule. In doing so, we are able to investigate the optimum detection for multiplicative watermarks embedded in many sub-band transformed domains. The methodology is also extended to multiplicative watermarks embedded in the magnitudes of DFT coefficients. It is demonstrated that the correlator is outperformed by the optimum detectors derived in this paper.
B. List of New Optimal Detection Structures
For the convenience of making comparisons, new optimum detectors constructed in this paper are listed in the following. The details of the development of these detection structures are in Sections III and IV.
For multiplicative watermarks embedded into the sub-band transformed domains, such as DCT, DWT, and pyramid transforms, if the embedding depths are known to the detector, the uniformly most powerful detector is where and are the parameters of GGD (see Section III-A).
Taking account of visual modeling and attacks, the robust optimum detector is where is a sequence of output of the watermarking channel (see Section III-C).
To achieve near-optimal performance for a large set of natural images or video frames, a "universally optimal" detector is which is particularly simple in form and is a special case of the robust optimum detector (see Section III-C).
For multiplicative watermarks embedded into the DFT magnitudes, the robust optimum detector is where and are the parameters of the Weibull distribution (see Section IV).
Derivations and appropriate thresholds for these detection structures are developed in the following sections. Computational complexities of these detectors are compared with that of the correlator in Section III-C. The performance of the robust optimal detector is compared with that of the uniformly optimal detector in 5, where the performance evaluations of the robust optimal detectors are also conducted.
III. OPTIMUM DETECTION FOR MULTIPLICATIVE WATERMARKS
For additive watermarks, the optimum detector has been derived, and the performance analysis has been conducted based on the GGD model [20] - [23] . To obtain the best performance for multiplicative watermarks, we analyze the optimum detection of the multiplicative watermarks and provide novel optimum detectors effective to various transformed domains. Specifically, the optimum detection statistic is derived for a class of general distributions, namely, the generalized Gaussian distributions. The methodology is extended to multiplicative watermarks cast in the magnitudes of DFT coefficients, where the magnitudes may be statistically described using the Weibull distribution.
A. GGD Model for Sub-band Coefficients
Multiplicative watermarks are often embedded in the transformed domains, such as DFT, DCT, DWT, and pyramid transforms. The coefficients of DCT, DWT, and Pyramid transform can be statistically modeled using GGD. Optimum detection for additive watermarks using GGD has been studied [20] - [22] , and large deviation bounds for performance analysis have also been developed [22] , [23] . Many watermarking techniques in the DFT domain employ amplitude modulation, taking advantage of the translation or shift invariance. GGD is not suitable for these techniques since DFT magnitudes are positive. We proceed by first modeling sub-band transform coefficients using a global stationary GGD and construct both uniformly most powerful detectors and robust optimum detectors; then, we model the magnitudes of DFT coefficients using Weibull distribution and constructing corresponding robust optimum detectors.
The probability density function (pdf) of the generalized Gaussian distribution is (4) where and is the mean, is the standard deviation of the distribution, and is the Gamma function. The distribution is denoted as . Many image transforms are orthogonal transforms and the mean value of coefficients in the AC sub-bands is close to zero, i.e., [28] . The power of the exponent is the shape parameter. The smaller is, the more impulsive the shape, and the heavier the tails. The GGD model contains the Laplacian and the Gaussian distributions as special cases, with and , respectively. When , it approaches a Dirac impulse. When , it tends to the uniform distribution. It has been found out that for AC coefficients in low or middle frequency sub-bands, generally , with most images having around . The imperceptibility requirement of watermarking implies that the magnitudes of watermark signals have to be small compared with the original image, and the total watermark energy should not be very large either. In this typical weak-signal scenario, good estimations of and can be obtained from the watermarked image instead of the original. For example, the values of and for the original Lena are and ; for watermarked Lena using multiplicative embedding rule with and after JPEG compression with quality factor 75, the estimated values are and . The differences from those of the original image are indeed insignificant. In cases where the estimation of parameters is undesirable, a "universally optimal" detector identified in Section III-C can be utilized. It does not need to estimate the parameters for each image yet achieves near optimal performance for a large set of natural images.
A globally stationary GGD can be employed to model the sub-band coefficients, where the distribution has a single variance. An alternative is to make use of a nonstationary Gaussian model, where a model of parallel Gaussian channels is used, with zero mean and with variance of each Gaussian channel estimated individually. In the parallel Gaussian model, the host signal is segmented into subsignals, and each subsignal whose size is relatively small is modeled approximately by a stationary Gaussian model. Since a certain subsignal is always difficult to model using the Gaussian distribution even if the size becomes small-for example, a subimage containing an edge on a simple background will typically have a high peak in the histogram which the Gaussian model does not have [29] -stationary GGD can be used to provide a more reasonable model for sub-band coefficients even for signals with small size.
B. Uniformly Most Powerful Detector
The gain factor for the multiplicative rule in (2) is small due to perceptual constraints. The multiplicative embedding rule relies on Weber's law as its perceptual model [19] , according to which the gain factor of noise can be as high as 2% of the local luminance without being perceived by human eyes [28] . Because of other masking effects such as the frequency sensitivity and the contrast masking, the actual value of may be even higher than 0.02 without incurring perceptual degradation. For stronger robustness or higher data rates, bigger can be applied. However, if is too big, the perceptual quality will degrade. The embedding process may depend on multimedia content and employ visual masking models to vary . In adddition, different s may be adopted, for example, from frame to frame in video watermarking. It is reasonable to use (5) where s are different embedding strengths for different s. Assuming the actual embedding strengths are known to the detector, a simple hypothesis testing is as follows:
Denote the pdf under as , . For GGD laws, GGD
. The likelihood ratio test (LRT) leads to (7) By taking logarithm, it can be simplified into (8) and the optimum test in the sense of the Neyman-Pearson lemma is (9) where is a properly chosen threshold to maximize the detection probability for a given false alarm rate. Its performance can also be investigated in a way similar to additive watermarking in [22] and [23] . However, other optimum detection structures are pursued, which are optimal in the sense of locally most powerful detection [30] .
C. Robust Optimum Detection of Multiplicative Watermarks
Attacks usually change the gain values. In the watermarking channel, an attacker attempts to disrupt the watermark while preserving the image quality. The attacker introduces a source of noise, and the output of the attacking channel becomes (10) where is the attack noise. Decomposing the noise as , the watermark strengths after attacks are (11) If is positive, the attacker helps to increase the embedding strength. In the case of robust watermarking, the largest gain factor could be determined using the just noticeable difference (JND), representing the largest permissible modulation strength without incurring perceptual degradation. For positive , exceeds JND, and the perceptual quality of the image is degraded. An ideal attacker, which is the worst case for the embedder, may introduce negative to decrease the embedding strengths or better obliterate it. To account for the attacks, we set a tolerance zone and seek the robust optimum detection of multiplicative watermarks.
Assimilating attacks as well as visual masking effects, the following composite hypothesis testing is considered to derive robust optimum detectors:
If the attacking channel is assumed known to the embedder in some sense, a watermarking detection game may be formulated, where the attacker attempts to maximize the probability of detection errors, whereas the embedder minimizes it, subject to certain constraints. Often, it is difficult to find a closed-form solution to this minimax optimization problem except for some attacking channels with certain strict restrictions [31] . For general attacking channels, our approach leads to a class of generalized correlation detectors, which are simple in form, intuitively appealing, and optimal at the same time.
The alternative is a composite hypothesis with non-Gaussian noise. LRT leads to the critical region , which depends on , and no UMP test is available for this composite hypotheses testing [32] . Without UMP, now we seek an optimum decision rule in the sense of locally most powerful detection (LMP).
For the transformed coefficients of DCT, DWT, or pyramid transforms, GGD , whose parameters can be estimated using the moments method, the goodness-of-fit method, or the minimum relative entropy method. Parallel channels of generalized Gaussian distributions are used, which include the global stationary GGD, with and fixed for all , as a special case. Under , GGD , GGD ; and under , GGD , GGD . To conserve the mean value of the transformed coefficients so that there is no "change of lighting conditions" undergone to the watermarked image, zero-mean watermarks are used, which include the CDMA sequence [14] , [19] and the random sequence drawn uniformly from . Since represent the allowable variations of watermark signals relative to the local neighborhood, from Weber's law, are small, and modulated "physical" watermarks are typical weak signals. Due to the imperceptibility requirement, in watermarking applications, and actually, it is found out that usually, in perceptual evaluations (see Section V). Now, denote
Then (14) and (15) Since is a zero-mean sequence (16) which does not depend on and tends to 0 as by the weak law of large numbers (WLLN). Thus, yields the locally optimum decision statistic , which is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: Assume is a sequence of independent random variables with GGD , and is a known, zero-mean sequence valued in , which is statistically independent of . For the multiplicative watermarks in (2) with , the robust optimum decision statistic is given by exists No (17) where is a proper threshold, and is a sequence of output of the watermarking channel.
The locally most powerful detection is also known as locally optimum detection (LOD) [32] , [33] . It is optimum for weak signals [34] and can still perform very well even when the signal strengths become large [35] . From the Pitman-Noether theorem, it can be shown that LOD is the most efficient asymptotically [32] , [33] . Since the optimum detectors in the above theorem correlate watermark signals with the observation magnitudes raised to the power of , we call them generalized correlation detectors or generalized correlators. If the sub-band coefficients are modeled using a global stationary GGD , the decision statistic can be made even simpler with absorbed into the threshold. The value of can be determined by perceptual evaluations for watermarked images. The larger under perceptual constraints, the more robust is. The computational complexities of the LOD and UMP detectors are compared. For each term in the summands in (8) and (17), the computations needed are tabulated in Table I . To further reduce the computational complexity, we demonstrate in Section V that the following detector can be employed as a "universally optimal" detector, in the sense that parameters of GGD need not be estimated for each image or video frame any longer (the estimation may pose computational burdens for watermarking applications in DVD, video, or real-time systems), (18) where is a proper threshold, is a sequence of output of the watermarking channel, and is a watermark to be verified. Since the square roots of the observation magnitudes are correlated with the watermark, we call it the square-root detector (SRD).
The mean and variance of the decision statistic in (17) can help us to determine a proper threshold . Under , the mean and the variance of are (19) and (20) where GGD . Since is valued in , is bounded above by 1, and the upper bound is achieved by a CDMA pseudo-noise sequence with or equiprobably. Thus, , and as , namely, the decision statistic under asymptotically approaches 0 as increases. Let . It can be shown that (21) where is the Gamma function. Using Gaussian approximation, under , , for any given false alarm rate , also known as the significance level, we obtain a threshold (22) where is the inverse of , which is the tail probability of a unit Gaussian distribution, namely, . The mean and variance of under generally do not have explicit forms; however, for special cases with and , simple expressions for them are shown in following sections.
D. LODs for Laplacian and Gaussian Models
DCT coefficients in AC sub-bands can be reasonably modeled using the Laplacian law [28] , [36] , which is a GGD law with . The coefficients of sub-band transforms as well as those of the pyramid transform may also be reasonably modeled using the Laplacian law [36] . The pdf of the Laplacian law is 
where , and . The Gaussian noise model is commonly used in the literature, which is a special GGD law with . For a global stationary Gaussian model, under the same condition as in Theorem 1, a generalized quadratic correlator is obtained: (29) To determine the mean and variance of , similar to the approach in the Laplacian case, we assume that the watermark sig- 
where and To maximize the detection probability under a given significance level, namely, to achieve the optimality using the Neyman-Pearson criterion, the threshold given in (22) can be utilized with . Alternatively, for equal priors and uniform cost [37] , a threshold may be chosen as to minimize the probability of detection errors.
E. Performance Analysis
In the detection of a specific watermark, there are two kinds of errors: A false alarm occurs when there is no such a watermark but the detector reports its existence, and a miss occurs when there is such a watermark but the detector reports its nonexistence. The detection errors undermine the credibility of the watermarking system and thus need to be controlled strictly. Especially, the false alarms are against the interests of consumers when the detectors are located inside consumer devices for controlling record and playback. Therefore, consumer electronic manufacturers require that the false alarm error ratio be extremely low. Accurate performance analysis of the corresponding watermarking methods is also completely necessary before they can actually be applied in the practice of law enforcement. [37] , . Therefore, the probability of a false alarm is (34) where . The probability of a miss is (35) and the ROC is (36) Since is often very small, which implies that , and is close to zero for orthogonal transforms, the approximate ROC is (37) The above performance analysis makes use of CLT, hence Gaussian approximations, to approximate the performance. Since sub-band coefficients are typically non-Gaussian, CLT can only provide crude analysis in this scenario. Future research can be done to provide accurate performance analysis beyond CLT, as has been done in [23] .
IV. OPTIMUM DETECTION OF MULTIPLICATIVE WATERMARKS IN DFT DOMAIN
Optimum detection for multiplicative watermarks in sub-band transformed domains such as DCT, DWT, and pyramid transform has been constructed. The methodology is extended in this section to the optimum detection of multiplicative watermarks in DFT magnitude domain. For multiplicative watermarks in DFT domain, a decoding rule other than the correlator has been proposed [24] , [25] . However, this decoding rule does not take into account the attacks as well as visual masking effects [24] . A new detection rule is constructed for multiplicative watermarks cast in the DFT domain, which is different from the one derived in [24] and [25] in terms of both derivation method and result. The Weibull distribution is adopted, similar to [24] , to statistically describe the magnitudes of DFT coefficients. The attacks as well as visual masking effects are incorporated into the formulation.
A. Statistical Model for Magnitudes of DFT Coefficients
The magnitudes of the DFT coefficients are modeled using the Weibull distribution [24] , [25] : (38) where and are positive constants controlling the mean, variance, and shape of the distribution. It is denoted as Weibull . The exponential and Rayleigh distributions are special cases with and , respectively. The mean and the standard deviation are (41) where are DFT magnitudes, and are modulated watermark signals. Assuming the decoder knows or can learn from the test signal of the modulated watermark, a simple hypothesis testing can be formed. Assuming Weibull and using LRT, an optimum decoder is (42) The optimality is in the sense of the Neyman-Pearson lemma. Its derivation and theoretical performance analysis can be done in an analogous way to [23] . Using the additive rule, one constraint is due to the positivity of . Since there is no explicit perceptual model for the DFT magnitudes, while a multiplicative watermark achieves high perceptual quality, we focus on multiplicative watermarking in the DFT magnitude domain.
B. Previous Work
The detection of multiplicative watermarks in the DFT domain is often based on a correlation detector. Recently, the detection of multiplicative watermarks in the DFT domain has been considered with the embedding equation (2), where are the magnitudes of DFT coefficients [24] , [25] . Two hypotheses are defined [24] : The system contains a certain watermark (hypothesis , or the system does not contain this parameter (hypothesis . The parameter space can be defined as (43) where (44) The watermark components are assumed to be uniformly distributed in , and is composed by an infinite number of watermarks. By considering the Weibull distribution of the magnitude of the DFT coefficients, it is demonstrated that can be approximated by [24] . Using this simplification, by invoking LRT, a decision statistic is obtained [24] : (45) where is the shape parameter for , and is a properly chosen threshold. For a given false-alarm rate, a suitable threshold may be determined utilizing CLT.
As noted by the authors in [24] , the derivation does not consider attacks as well as visual masking effects. In the embedding stage, a visual masking method is exploited, which modifies the embedding strengths pixel-wise [24] . That is, is different for different . In the derivation of the detector, a single embedding strength is assumed for employing the Neyman-Pearson lemma [24] .
C. Barni's Detector From a Simple Hypothesis Testing
The decoder in [24] can be obtained, actually, through the following simple hypothesis testing: :
versus : for the same embedding rule:
, . Indeed, under , has the same distribution as , namely, ; under , by changing variables, has the following distribution: (46) Assuming that the observations are independent under both hypotheses, we have , where . Invoking LRT [32] and taking the logarithm, Barni's detector in (45) 
D. Robust Optimum Detection of Multiplicative DFT Domain Watermarks
In this section, robust optimum detectors for multiplicative watermarks in DFT domain are derived. Considering the visual masking and attacking effects, as discussed in Section III, the following hypothesis testing is conducted: : versus : for , which is a composite hypothesis versus a simple one.
Due to the invisibility constraint, is small. Watermark is required to be zero mean to guarantee that there is no "change of lighting conditions" to the watermarked image. CDMA pseudo random sequence [14] , [19] is a special case of these watermarks. By adopting LOD, the following result for the detection of the multiplicative watermark in DFT domain is obtained.
Theorem 2: Assume is a sequence of independent random variables with obeying Weibull , and is a known, zero-mean sequence valued in , which is statistically independent of . At the transmitter end, the multiplicative watermarks are embedded using with . The watermarked image is then sent through the watermarking channel, which introduces distortions to the composite image. At the receiver end, for the output sequence , the optimum decision rule is given by no (47) where is a properly selected threshold. Let , and the sum of is defined as for convenience, namely,
. Denote the pdf of under as . For a given false alarm rate , the value of can be determined from the decision rule (47) by solving (48) To figure out pdf , we will first find out the pdf of under . Under such a circumstance, , and will be a noisy version of . To proceed without assuming any fixed distribution of the attacks, we consider , and under , . Since is a monotonically increasing or decreasing function of according to the sign of , the pdf of under can be evaluated by the following expression [24] , [38] : (49) where , is the first derivative of , and is the Heaviside function. Therefore, we have (50) It can be seen that is distributed as an exponential pdf with mean and variance . It follows from CLT that under can be assumed to have a normal distribution, with mean and variance given by (51) (52) Therefore, the false-alarm probability is (53) where is defined as . Therefore, for a given false-alarm rate, we have (54) In particular, given , we have (55)
V. EXPERIMENTS
Experiments are conducted to demonstrate the effectiveness of the new detection structures constructed in the paper. Multiplicative watermarks are embedded in both DCT and DWT domains. For DWT domain embedding, a three-level DWT using Daubechies' linear-phase 9/7 biorthogonal filterbanks is used. The watermarks are cast in HH sub-bands at Level 3, which are CDMA pseudo-noise sequences with or 1. First, the perceptual quality in multiplicative watermarking is evaluated. For embedding depth below 0.3, a small stepsize equal to 0.01 is taken to evaluate the perceptual quality; for above 0.3, a stepsize 0.05 is taken to judge the severity of perceptual degradations. The subjective evaluations have been conducted by two young viewers with normal HVS under normal viewing conditions for images displayed on computer screens. The results are tabulated in Table II for DCT domain embedding and  in Table III for DWT domain embedding. It can be seen that DWT domain watermarking has better perceptual quality than in the DCT domain. In the DCT domain, when is below 0.20, good fidelity can be obtained; in the DWT domain, when is below about 0.22, excellent imperceptibility is obtained. Even as becomes as large as above 0.30, perceptual distortions are not so annoying; especially on plain, featureless areas, visual distortions are not as severe as those of additive watermarking.
To evaluate the proposed LOD detector in (8) , it is compared to the UMP detector in (17) . A fixed embedding strength is used and multiple-symbol messages are encoded into watermarks in a way similar to CDMA embedding [26] , [27] by dividing the image into nonoverlapping embedding regions. Each codeword has 32 bits, and one message bit is encoded into one codeword using binary phase shift keying (BPSK) [26] . The length of the codeword is short and many decoding errors are incurred, which discriminates well the decoding capabilities of both detectors. The decoding errors are tabulated in Table IV . It can be seen that LOD has the same decoding capabilities as UMP.
To compare the performances of LOD detectors, we have fixed some shape parameters for the GGD model in our experiments. The detectors used are generalized quadratic correlator, generalized linear correlator, and SRD.
Lena is watermarked using and . Such embedding strengths are used here so that ROC curves can be used to compare the performance. With larger , ROC curves are all straight lines with detection probabilities all equal to 1. The PSNRs for the watermarked images are 57.99 and 54.47 dB, respectively. The ROC curves are plotted in Fig. 1 . It can be seen that SRD outperforms the other two since the shape parameter of HH sub-band at Level 3 of Lena is 0.47, which is close to 0.5.
Then, the robustness of the detectors is tested using extensive experiments. The embedding depth is . The differences between the watermarked and original images are displayed in Fig. 2 , with magnitudes magnified by 100 for viewing purposes. The watermarked images are compressed using JPEG with different quality factors from 100 to 1, and the compressed images are tested using the proposed detectors. The resulting decision statistics are plotted in Fig. 3 . Without watermarking, the decision statistics are 49.99, 0.43, and 0.029, respectively, for , and . JPEG compressed watermarked images can be detected.
The ROC curves are plotted for , , and after severe attacks for a large set of images (over 3000 natural images in our database with size 128 128). For example, Fig. 4 plots the ROCs for JPEG compression with quality factor 10 and 5. Figs. 5-7 plot the ROCs for median, average, and Wiener filtering, respectively, with window sizes 3 3 and 7 7. Fig. 8 plots the sample images of Lena after intensity scaling, Gaussian noise adding, and salt-and-pepper noise adding, respectively. Fig. 9 plots the ROCs after these attacks. It can be seen that after severe attacks the SRD still has the best performance since the shape parameters for natural images are usually in the range of [22] , [39] , and many around 0.5. The generalized correlator corresponding to (SRD) can be employed as a fixed robust detector for good overall performance for a large set of images.
The performance analysis derived in Section III-E is also investigated. Experiments are conducted using . The empirical ROCs for , , and are obtained by varying the threshold and the key to the pseudo-random sequence. They are plotted in Fig. 10 . The theoretical ROCs are also plotted. It can be seen that the empirical and theoretical performances are in good agreement if the sub-band coefficients are modeled using the Gaussian model. If the Laplacian model or GGD model with is used, then the theoretical performance analysis using (36) is more conservative than the empirical performance. This is because the actual shape parameter for middle-or low-frequency sub-bands is usually in the range of [22] , [23] , whereas CLT is employed for the theoretical analysis, which is crude for non-Gaussian random variables. More accurate performance analysis is a line of future research. Watermarks are embedded into the DFT domain by modifying a set of full-frame DFT coefficients of the image. The watermarks consist of 1000 length-bipolar zero-mean pseudo random sequences. One of these sequences is chosen and embedded adopting the multiplicative embedding rule. A visual mask similar to that in [24] is utilized. The watermark is cast into the middle-frequency region of the image. Since the magnitudes of the DFT coefficients are symmetric about the center, the watermark is cast to half the DFT image and mirrors the watermark to the other half. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that is drawn from a single Weibull distribution. By using maximum likelihood estimation, the original data are fit to Weibull distribution. For Lena, the estimated exponent is . The 500th watermark is embedded as , and of our new detection scheme are plotted in Fig. 11 . It shows that the decision statistic differentiates well the embedded one from the rest. After attacking, still performs very well. For example, the decision statistics after the JPEG compression with quality factor 5, and those after median filtering with window size 7 7 are plotted in Fig. 12 . The performance of the new detectors is also compared with that of the correlator after attacks. It can be seen from Fig. 13 that the new detectors outperform the correlator after JPEG compression with . The experiments have demonstrated the power of the proposed robust optimum detectors. In the following sections, an application of the new detection scheme to combined audio and video watermarking is proposed. VI. APPLICATION TO COMBINED AUDIO AND VIDEO WATERMARKING
The robust optimum detection method can be applied to many watermarking systems. In this paper, we particularly focus on an application to combined audio and video watermarking.
A. Combined Audio and Video Watermarking for Authentication
Digital watermarking includes the robust watermarking to notify or protect the copyrights and the fragile watermarking to authenticate the multimedia content. The fragile watermarking modifies the host signal in a way such that the modification can hardly be detected by human eyes or ears, but with a specifically designed detector, it can reliably test the authenticity of the image or even localize the tampered regions.
The fragile watermarking for multimedia authentication is different from the classical cryptographic authentication such as message authentication code (MAC). It does not need a separate file to append to the original one, and it is capable of verifying only the content instead of the data, which allows more tolerance to commonly used data manipulations in transmission and storage. The basic requirements for fragile watermarking are invisibility, fragility, and reliability: The watermarks should be transparent to human eyes or ears; they should be fragile to content editions or alterations, and the verification scheme should make a vanishingly small number of errors since the verification results may be used in the legal process. The multimedia authentication systems may be of interest to any parties who want to tamperproof the content of the multimedia so that they can ensure that the content has not been edited, altered, or damaged. These systems have applications in commerce, defense, journalism, and law.
In the literature, most research in authentication has focused only on single media like video or audio, but the typical multimedia stream consists of both video and audio data, and watermarking only one medium might not guarantee the integrity of the multimedia data. For example, in journalism or teleconferencing, it is quite possible that the watermarked video may not be altered, but its accompanying audio could be edited. In this case, the watermark embedded in the video is not disturbed; however, the content or the semantics of the audiovisual data may be totally changed. Therefore, it is necessary to protect against alteration of one of the components without interfering with the other. Watermarking both components may provide a solution to this problem. However, if the watermarks for the components are independent, the copy attack [40] may be used to copy a watermark from a legitimately watermarked material to another without knowing the embedding system and cryptographic keys. Since audiovisual data may undergo several post production operations such as cutting, editing, and setting in other audiovisual data, the integrity and synchronization of both components in each segment are more important than the integrity of one component alone. An approach to countering these attacks and ensuring integrity and synchronization is to watermark the combined audio and video, where a cryptographic signature is linked to the multimedia content. In the literature, Dittmann et al. [41] proposed two solutions for the protection of combined audio and video data. The first one is to insert the same time code to both audio and video data. The audio and video data are not combined, and copy attack can be used to make unauthorized embedding of watermarks. The second one uses the changing of the signs of the audio sequence as an audio feature, which is encoded into the video as the video watermark; it uses the Canny edge detector extracting the edge information of a video frame and embeds the feature code into the audio as the audio watermark. The audio feature is low-level and not very robust to audio compressions. We exploit the characteristics of the audiovisual data and propose a new combined video and audio watermarking method. The mel-frequency cepstra are employed to extract the content information from audio. The feature codes of audio are mapped to watermark patterns cryptographically and imprinted using multiplicative watermarking into video. The optimum detector for multiplicative watermarking is applied. The scheme is tolerable to common video and audio compressions but sensitive to content changes.
B. Information Extraction From Audio
Our goal is to embed the information of one media into the other to verify the integrity of audiovisual data. The human auditory system (HAS) is much more sensitive to noise than the human visual system (HVS). Powerful audio-processing freeware is available on the Internet, which can change the structure of audio signals dramatically while retaining acceptable subjective quality. With these difficulties in mind, we choose to extract audio subjective-content information and embed it into the video.
The well-known technique of mel-frequency cepstra has proven to be highly effective in automatic speech recognition and in modeling the subjective pitch and frequency content of audio signals. Psychophysical studies have found the phenomena of the mel pitch scale and the critical band, and the frequency scale-warping to the mel or Bark scale has led to the cepstrum domain representation. The warped cepstral distance has been defined accordingly [42] : (56) where is frequency in Barks, is the spectrum on a Bark scale, is the Nyquist frequency in Barks, and is a nonlinear function mapping the Bark scale to the linear scale . If two audio signals have similar subjective contents, the warped cepstrum distance should be small.
To incorporate the critical band phenomena into the cepstrum domain representation and to simulate the subjective spectrum efficiently, a filterbank spaced uniformly on the mel scale is used. The modified spectrum of consists of the output power of these filters when is the input. Denoting these power coefficients by , , the mel-frequency cepstrum coefficients (MFCC) are defined as [43] (57) where is the length of the cepstrum, and is the number of filters in the filterbank.
Since the audio signal might undergo many manipulations, the extracted features need to be robust against all allowed attacks, such as filtering, compression, or MP3 encoding. As long as the content has not been modified, the extracted features need to be similar. Toward this end, we choose to make use of the first MFCC of the truncated audio signals with a sliding window, for its well capturing the envelope of the audio signals, and for its robustness. The original audio signals are first downsampled to a low sampling rate; then, the filterbank is applied to compute the MFCC. Fig. 14 shows the first MFCC before and after the IMA ADPCM compression with bandwidth 4 kHz. The original speech has bandwidth 22.05 kHz. The downsampling factor is 4. It can be seen that the shapes are approximately the same.
C. Embedding Feature Code Into Video
The audio features are extracted by using MFCC so that they are audio content-dependent but at the same time insensitive to manipulations. To further reduce the sensitivity, we make use of the first MFCC coefficient only and quantize the centralized MFCC to several crude levels.
The audio MFCC frame rate is chosen so that each video frame corresponds to several MFCCs. These MFCCs are mapped using a secret function to an integer, which is used as the cryptographic key to generate a bipolar pseudorandom noise pattern . It is the watermark to be embedded into the video. For a simple example, the number of MFCCs could be chosen as 2 for each frame, and the quantization level is chosen as 4; then, there are 16 possible bi-tuple patterns. The encoding function is a one-to-one bijection between 16 bi-tuple vector patterns and 16 pseudorandom noise patterns, which are mutually orthogonal.
Many schemes have been proposed for video watermarking [16] , [44] - [47] . A joint watermarking and compression of the video scheme has been proposed [46] . The amount of compression of the most recently coded frame of the same type as the current frame was monitored, and the watermark added was adapted according to the degradation due to coding. In this paper, we only adapt the watermark strengths to the frame types. We adopt a multiplicative watermarking rule in the DCT domain:
where is a series of DCT coefficients of the th video frame, is the bipolar watermark formed from the audio features, and is the watermark strength. Since the frames are intracoded using DCT only, we set corresponding to a small value, which roughly represents the Weber's fraction [19] , [48] . The frames are forward predicted using the motion-compensated prediction, and the residual errors are compressed using DCT. The degradation due to compression is more than that of frames. The corresponding is set larger. The frames are coded most aggressively, and the degradation due to coding is the largest. Moreover, the watermarks embedded in the B frames do not propagate. The corresponding is the largest.
D. Verification of Audiovisual Data
The features of the accompanying audio are first extracted for the test audiovisual data. The extraction is similar to the embedding process, and the parameters such as the audio frame rate, the quantization level, and the encoding function are exactly the same. The extracted features are encoded and mapped to a bipolar pseudorandom sequence . If there is no modification to the original accompanying audio data at all, . If there is a certain digital data processing, . However, if the audio data have been edited or falsified, there will be little similarity between and , which can be measured using the Hamming distance. To guarantee the mutual verification, we need to detect the watermark embedded in the video data. The decision statistic for the watermarking is defined as the generalized quadratic correlator:
(59) Fig. 15 shows the decision statistic for a segment of Flower Garden with accompanying audio. For GOPs of audiovisual data, we define the authenticity indicator as to indicate the authenticity of the content, where is a properly chosen threshold, is the number of frames in one GOP, and is the Heaviside function. The binary value of AI indicates the authenticity or nonauthenticity of this GOP.
The video watermarking needs to be tolerant to certain degrees of video compression, such as MPEG-1. The robustness of a video watermarking scheme to MPEG first depends on the chosen bitrate and second on the variation of the embedded signals over consecutive frames. It has been proposed that the watermark be the same for at least the length of a complete GOP [49] . Since the GOP structure might be changed after reencoding, here, we choose to generate different watermarks for different frames.
To validate our proposed combined audio and video watermarking system, we have conducted experiments on the Flower Garden sequence accompanied with a segment of audio signal whose sampling rate is 44.1 Hz. The features extracted from the audio data are the first coefficients of the MFCC with the audio frame rate 60 Hz. For frames, the watermarks are modulated with , which is the same as that in [46] . For frames, is taken as 0.18. For frames, we take . Here, we adapt simply to the types of frames. The DCT-domain adaptive scheme proposed in [46] may be incorporated into our framework to further improve the detection results. We use and the number of GOPs in our experiments.
Subjective evaluations of watermarked video have shown no appreciable perceptual quality loss incurred due to watermarking. For 48 frames, the results of for both watermarked and unwatermarked video are shown in Fig. 15 . The corresponding authenticity indicator is 1.
To show that watermarks are persistent after video compression, we use MPEG-1 to compress the watermarked video sequence. Fig. 16 shows the resulting for compressed video with data rate 1.152 Mb/s, which corresponds roughly to the VHS quality. The authenticity indicator is 1.
To show the effectiveness of the proposed scheme after audio compression, we use IMA ADPCM to compress the audio signal with bandwidth 4 kHz. This aggressive compression is often used in speech coding with telephone quality. Fig. 17 shows the resulting decision statistics. The results are exactly the same as those without any audio compression.
For a different segment of the same audio data, which is used to falsify the original audio data, the results of the decision statistic are shown in Fig. 18 . The authentication indicator is 0 in this case.
The proposed combined audio and video watermarking method is also compared with that in [41] , which extracts changing of signs as audio features to embed into video, and extracts edge information as video feature to embed into audio. For comparison, the results of the decision statistic watermarked video are shown in Fig. 19 , with audio and video 
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
In this paper, novel optimum detectors for multiplicative watermarks are derived using locally optimum detection for the generalized Gaussian distributions. Special cases for the Laplacian model and the Gaussian model have been examined. The square-root detector has been shown to be nearly optimum for majority natural images. Novel optimum detectors for the Weibull distribution have also been constructed. The experiments have validated the theoretical analysis. The results can be applied to multiplicative watermarking systems for copyright notification and protection and fingerprinting. It may also find applications in content-based multimedia indexing and retrieval. We have applied the robust watermarking detection to combined audio and video watermarking. It can tolerate commonly used audio and video compressions but is sensitive to content changes. It can be applied to audiovisual content authentication in commerce, law, defense, and journalism. For future research, more performance analyses are needed [50] , and incorporation of any refined perceptual model for multiplicative watermarks can be investigated.
